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We study an optimal movement strategy of agents during an ongoing epidemic among the (D)
states of a country having various levels of infection spreading. Given that a fraction of the agents
have the choice of staying in any two given states, we show that the total infected population in the
country could be as low as that achieved with a complete stoppage of inter-state movements for a
prolonged period, provided that the agents follow a stochastic strategy, used in the Minority Game,
for their movement decisions. Due to the random (but fixed in time) choices of the agents, the
system essentially forms a set of D/2 coupled Minority Games, played simultaneously. We further
show that it is the agents moving once between any two states following the stochastic strategy who
are less likely to be infected than those not having (or not opting for) such a movement choice, when
the risk of getting infected during the travel is not considered.
During the ongoing global crisis since the outbreak of
the COVID-19 pandemic [1], many countries around the
world have imposed varying degrees of restrictions on in-
ternational as well as their domestic travels. At times
when such restrictions are fully or partially lifted, an in-
evitable question for a significant fraction of the popula-
tion would be to change their locations in order to escape
the regions of higher infections. But given an influx of
population, some of whom could be a carrier of the dis-
ease, to a relatively less infected region can increase the
infection rate in those regions. Therefore, a region which
was initially had low infections, could become a less vi-
able option in the subsequent times, due to movements of
population there from other higher infected regions. Fur-
thermore, if a country has D states with different rates
of infection, one person may have a rather limited op-
tion in terms of the number of states in which they can
live for a long time. Also, in a given state, different per-
sons will have their options distributed between the rest
D− 1 states. We can consider the relatively safer places
from the perspective of one agent as a limited resource
that is being sought by a large number of agents. Due to
the inherent coupling arising out of the possible parallel
choices of one state by agents from multiple other states,
the problem finding the said resource of safe locations
can now become a cooperative, multi-agent, complex op-
timization process with emergent statistical properties.
A large number of agents competing for limited re-
sources is a generic problem appearing in a wide range
of situations such as in economics, in sharing natural
resources to allocating internet bandwidth and so on.
There have been many attempts to address these prob-
lems from a game theoretic perspective (see e.g., con-
gestion games [2]). When the number of choices for an
agent is limited to two, the resource allocation problem
generally falls within the category of the Minority Game
(MG) [3–6], where an odd number (N = 2M + 1) of
agents try to be, through repeated and parallely decided
autonomous choices, in the minority group, thereby win-
ning a higher share of the (conserved) resources, or in the
language of game theory, a positive pay-off. Clearly, the
Nash equilibrium state for the problem is when the pop-
ulations P1 and P2 in the two choices are M and M + 1,
such that one agent cannot benefit by their own action
alone provided that the others stick to their respective
choices. The objective is to reach this state of minimal
fluctuation ∆ = |P1−P2| between the two choices in the
least possible amount of time.
While a complete random decision would keep the
population difference between the two choices very high
(∆ ∼
√
N), a deterministic cooperative learning mech-
anism with the past memory of winning choices can re-
duce it by a constant factor [5]. A stochastic strategy
[7], on the other hand, can reduce the fluctuation to the
minimum possible value (∆ ∼ 1) in a very short time
(τ ∼ log logN). But this strategy requires the additional
input of the fluctuation in the previous step to be sup-
plied to the agents, where traditionally they are supplied
only with the sign of the fluctuation i.e., the winning
choice. However, the stochastic strategy still performs
quite well (τ ∼ logN) when ∆(t) is not exactly know
to the agents but a guess value is supplied through an
appropriate annealing schedule [8].
In the usual Minority Games, the variations in the tar-
get variable i.e., the populations in the two choices, take
place due to the movements or switching of choices be-
tween the two options. In this work, we study the sit-
uation where D number of total choices exists, but one
agent tries to be in the minority group in terms of the
infection number, by moving between only two choices.
The two choices for the N agents are random. Therefore,
the infected population in a given region can change due
to (a) movements of agents from the other D− 1 regions
and (b) due to the evolution of the epidemic within the
region. The evolution of epidemic in our case follow the
dynamics of a Susceptible (S)- Infected (I)- Recovered
2(R) model. Given that the target variable for minimiz-
ing fluctuation (infected population) is not a conserved
quantity, an equilibrium state is not defined. However, a
well defined quantity is the total infected population in
the country after the end of the epidemic. We show here
that a stochastic strategy for switching choices, with a
restriction on the total number of allowed switches, can
reduce the total infected number compared to a tempo-
rary ban on inter-state movements. Furthermore, it is
the agents opting for switching of their choice who are
less likely to be infected. This shows an individual in-
centive exists for a strategy which is good for the whole
population.
To establish the utility of the stochastic strategy,
we first study the dynamics of the parallel Minority
Game without an epidemic, where the objective is the
usual minimization of the fluctuations in the populations
among the choices. As there are D choices, the problem
reduces to D/2 decoupled Minority Games, if the agents
in a pair of choices are completely non-overlapping with
the agents of any other pair of choices. The strategy
that has proved to be the most efficient [7] in reducing
fluctuations in such cases is that agents in the major-
ity choice at an instant t will switch with a probability
p+(t) =
(∆(t)−1)/2
M+∆(t)+1 and the agents in the minority will
not switch (p−(t) = 0). However, the choices here could
be overlapping i.e., the agents in one choice at a given
instant may have their other choice distributed between
D − 1 options (see Fig. 1(a)). We keep the switching
probability for a given (α-th) agent in the majority at
a given instant to be p+(t) =
(Pαi −P
α
j −1)/2
Pα
i
, where Pαi
is the population at the i-th choice of the α-th agent,
Pαj is the population at the location of the other choice
assigned to the agent α and Pαi (t) > P
α
j (t). We ensure
the initial condition such that a given region is a possible
choice for 2M + 1 agents. Therefore, a global minimiza-
tion of fluctuation is achieved when D/2 locations have
population M and the other D/2 locations have popula-
tion M +1. Nevertheless, due to the random assignment
of choices between the agents, a given agent can end up
with two choices, both having populationsM+1. We call
that a ‘majority locked’ agent. In Fig. 1(b) we show the
variation of the fraction of this majority locked agents
with time as D is increased. The fraction does not al-
ways go to zero, and the time taken to reach a minimum
value increases exponentially with D. We then impose a
constraint that one agent can switch only once (see Fig.
1(c)). Then the fraction of the majority locked agents
still does not go to zero, but a reduction, although com-
paratively low, can be achieved in a time scale with no
significant variation withD in the rage of the simulations.
Therefore, we see that the this movement strategy still
works considerably better than a random choice, where
fluctuation grows with population involved with
√
N or
variations of that which does not change such scaling but
only reduces the fluctuation by a constant factor at best.
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FIG. 1. (a) The schematic diagram for the agents and their
choices in four regions. A filled shape represents a site oc-
cupied by an agent and a similar empty shape, connected by
black line, represents their alternative choice. Here all agents
have an alternative choice. If only similar agents and their al-
ternative choices exist between a pair of regions, say the yellow
or green regions, then the problem reduces to a pair of decou-
pled Minority Game. However, the games are coupled when
an agent has two choices between two types of regions, marked
by red lines. (b) The fraction of majority locked agents (see
text) are shown with time for different numbers of regions.
The fraction decreases with time, but with a time scale that
grows exponentially with D. The number of movements by
any given agent is completely unrestricted. (b) The fraction
of majority-locked agents are shown when a restriction of only
one switch of choice is imposed on the agents. The decrease
in the fraction is low, but almost independent of D.
We then proceed with this stochastic strategy of move-
ment to apply in the case where an epidemic dynamics is
present in the D states (see e.g., [11–14] for very recent
works on the COVID-19 spreading and its effects). We
consider the sites of a square lattice (L×L) to represent
possible locations for agents in one state. The simplest
possible case where a parallel Minority Game could be
defined is when D = 4, which we take here. We take
L = 160 and each state is initially occupied with 10000
agents i.e., an occupation fraction of about 0.39. This is
less than the site percolation threshold [9], which repre-
sents a reasonable restriction in interactions among the
populations in terms of either the imposed social distanc-
ing or due to other factors seen in epidemic spreading [10]
(see Supplemental Materials Fig. for variations of infec-
3tion with occupation fraction). The agents are in one
of three states: Susceptible (S), Infected (I) or Recov-
ered (R). At any instant, one infected agent can infect
its neighboring 8 agents (nearest neighbors and diago-
nal neighbors) with probability β, provided the neigh-
bors are in S-state. An infected agent remains infected
for a period τ = 14 days and then recovers. Given
that the reproduction rate R0 for the COVID-19 pan-
demic is about 2.28 [15], we keep the infection probability
γ = 2.28/(τz) ≈ 0.02, as τ = 14 and z = 8. While this
gives a correct order for the infection probability, this is
by no means a precise estimate, which will vary due to
the clustering of the locations, immunity variations of the
agents and so on.
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FIG. 2. The time evolution of the total fraction of agents
moved, the infected fraction in region 1 and the total infected
fraction, each independently normalized (see text) and plot-
ted for various duration and start times of lock down. The
lock down start and end times are indicated in each figure.
Inevitably, a spike in the movement is noted immediately fol-
lowing the lifting of lock down. This almost in all cases re-
sults in a second peak for the total infected fraction. When
the effect of lock down is minimal (very late imposition), the
restricted movements following the strategy mentioned in Eq.
(1) seems to minimize the total infection.
As indicated before, not every agent has the choice of
relocating to a different state for a long time. We assign
a fraction g = 0.04 of the agents with a choice to move to
one of the remaining 3 locations only once during entire
period of the epidemic dynamics. The remaining ques-
tion is then the decisions of the agents with movement
choices to switch (or not) to their alternative locations.
A natural tendency for such agents would be to avoid
the location with higher infections i.e., to remain in the
minority group in terms of the infected population. How-
ever, the infected population at any location will vary due
to the epidemic dynamics as well as the due to movements
from other locations. We apply a similar stochastic strat-
egy i.e., one agent (α) in the higher infected region (say,
i-th region) will move with a probability
p+ =
(Iαi − Iαj )/2
gPαi /(D − 1)
, (1)
where Iαi is the i-th choice for the α-th agent, P
α
i is
the population at the i-th choice of the α-th agent and
Iαi (t) > I
α
j (t). The agents already in the lesser infected
region compared to their other alternative at an instant
do not switch at that instant (p− = 0). The factor (D−1)
is introduced as the agents can move to any one of the
D − 1 regions, giving an average shift of (Iαi − Iβj )/2 to
the j-th region. Note that as the infected number is not
conserved, the total number may not be odd, therefore
we remove the −1 factor in the numerator, as used before.
The initial condition of the simulation is each region
has equal population (10000) and all but a small fraction
of agents in only one of the regions are initially infected.
We keep 15 infected agents in D = 1 and all remaining
agents everywhere are in S-state. At every time step, one
update attempt to all agents, first the epidemic dynamics
is carried out and then the movements are made following
the strategy mentioned in Eq. (1).
Finally, we also study the effect of a complete lock
down of inter-state movements for a period of time. The
epidemic dynamics, of course, continue during such a pe-
riod. Below we report the effects of the various duration
and start times of such stoppages of movements on the
evolution of the total infected number and other related
quantities.
In Fig. 2, we show the time evolution of the num-
ber of agents moving (normalized by the total number of
agents having choice of such movement), the fraction of
the infected population in region 1 (normalized by the in-
stantaneous population at that region N1(t)) where the
initial infection started and the total infected fraction
of all four regions, for various duration of lock downs
(three, seven and ten weeks) i.e., complete stoppage of
inter-state movements and for various start times of such
a lock down. Invariably, a spike in the movement is no-
ticed immediately following the lifting of a lock down,
which then subsequently decreases. This is intuitively
clear, as a lock down will keep the initially infected re-
gion highly infectious and immediately after the lifting
of the lock down, agents will move out of it (see SM Fig.
4 for details). Almost in all cases, the lifting of the lock
down induces a second peak in the total infected fraction.
Clearly, this is due to deconfinement and spreading of in-
fections among the different regions. Indeed, the total
infected fraction becomes rather limited, when the im-
posed lock down is very late, which basically amounts to
only following the restricted movement rules mentioned
above.
To quantify the effects of movements on the travel re-
strictions, in Fig. 3(a) we show the movement, infected
in region 1 and the total infected fractions when no stop-
page of inter-state travels is imposed. But the agents
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FIG. 3. (a) The time evolution of the movement fraction, in-
fected fraction in region 1 and the total infected fraction, each
independently normalized, are show when there is no stop-
page imposed in the inter-state movements. But the move-
ments always follow the strategy mentioned in Eq. (1). (b)
The fraction of the total infected population, at the end of
the epidemic dynamics, is shown for various duration of lock
downs against the mid-point of the lock down period. A small
initial lock down is least effective. Comparisons should be
made with the infected fraction for no imposition of inter-
state movement, shown in the vertical line. This seems to
work better in almost all cases. (c) The relative infection
probabilities are shown for the agents opting for switching
their location divided by the corresponding probability for
the agents who did not switch. Given the ratio is always less
than 1, the population opting for the switching following Eq.
(1) are less likely to be infected, where we did not consider
the chance of getting infected during the travel.
can switch only once, following the stochastic strategy in
Eq. (1). We then compare the total infected fraction, at
the end of the epidemic dynamics, for various duration of
lock downs with that when no stoppage is imposed. We
see that the stochastic strategy performs better almost in
all cases (see Fig. 3(b). Also, if the ratio of the infection
probability is calculated for the agents opting for a switch
in their choices following Eq. (1) and the same for the
agents who did not switch, we see that the ratio is always
less than 1, indicating on average a lower risk of infec-
tion for the agents making the switch (Fig. 3(c)). This
indeed indicates a stability of the strategy itself, as the
agents following it gets benefited, while also benefiting
(although by a lesser amount) all the remaining agents.
In conclusion, we have posed the problem of move-
ments of agents among various infected regions as an op-
timization problem similar to a set of coupled Minority
Games played in parallel. We study the effects of var-
ious ranges of travel restrictions and find that only the
movements following a stochastic strategy described in
Eq. (1) and an additional restriction of the agents be-
ing allowed to switch only once between the two choices
given to a fraction of them, reduces the overall infection
considerably. We also show the stability of the strategy
in the sense of a reduced infection rate among the agents
opting for a switch in their choices.
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS
Details of movement due to stochastic strategy:
An intuitive way to further elaborate on Fig. 1 is to
plot the relative risk of region 1, with respect to the av-
erage risk in the remaining three regions. A measure
of such a risk is the difference between the number of
infected agents in region 1 and the average number of
infected agents in the remaining regions. In Fig. 4 we
plot the relative risk, with the changes in the population
in region 1 from its starting value 10000 for various du-
ration of lock downs and their starting times. There is a
symmetric oscillatory pattern in the population change
in region 1, when the total infected fraction is high. For
lower total infection, the symmetric property vanishes.
We show in Fig. how does the curve vary for the case
without a lock down.
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FIG. 4. We plot the time evolution of the relative risk at
region 1 with respect to the average risk in the remaining
regions. The change in the population in region 1, is anti-
correlated with the risk (see text for details).
We also show that the total infected fraction is a mono-
tonically increasing (almost linear) single valued function
of the number of infected agents moving during the entire
epidemic dynamics (see Fig. 5). This is true irrespective
of the lock down duration and the starting point, or even
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FIG. 5. The top figure shows the variation of the total infected fraction with the number of infected agents moved for various
lock down duration and starting times. The bottom figure shows the same variation for both with and without lock down.
without a lock down. This implies that the epidemic
dynamics and the movement strategies are largely inde-
pendent. It is only the total infected people moving that
affects the total infected fraction.
Simulation details In Fig. 6 we plot the occupation
fraction (by varying L) with total infected fraction. For
our simulations, we keep this ratio at about 0.39, which
is realistic for a population.
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FIG. 6. The total infected fraction is plotted with the varia-
tion of occupation fraction. The simulation is done only for
one region.
Finally, the outline of the algorithm used for the sim-
ulations is shown in Fig. 7
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